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CONDOMINIUtM ACT ADDITION GIVES




In 1997, the New York State Legislature added to the
state's then thirty-three year old Condominium Act (Real
Property Law article 9-B)' a new section-section 339-jj-
designed to enhance the theretofore virtually nonexistent
ability of boards of managers of New York condominiums to
borrow money.'
The purpose of this article is for the authors-who were
principal drafters of and spokespersons for the legislation 3-
Copyright 1999, Matthew J. Leeds and Joel E. Miller.
Member, New York Bar; partner, Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn &
Berman, LLP, New York City; A.B., 1974, New York University (University Col-
lege); J.D., 1977, State University of New York at Buffalo Faculty Law and Juris-
prudence; LL.M., 1983, New York University School of Law. Mr. Leeds is co-chair of
the Condominiums and Cooperatives Committee of the Real Property Section of the
New York State Bar Association.
"" Member, New York Bar; sole practitioner, Queens County, New York City;
A.B., 1954, Columbia University, J.D., 1956, Columbia University; LL.M., 1964,
New York University School of Law. Mr. Miller, a former professor at the St. John's
University School of Law, has served on and chaired committees of the American
Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association.
1 The current version of the Condominium Act constitutes sections 339-d
through -kk of the New York Real Property Law (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999). All
section references in this article not otherwise identified are to the New York Real
Property Law.
2 Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 498, 1997 N.Y. Laws 1457 (codified at N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW §339-j (McKinney Supp. 1999)). The act that added section 339-j is en-
titled "An act to amend the real property law, in relation to borrowing by a board of
managers on behalf of the unit owners of a condominium." Id.
3 The other practitioners, all members of the Condominiums and Cooperatives
Committee of the Real Property Section of the New York State Bar Association, who
took part in "brainstorming" sessions that led to the original legislative proposal
were Perry Balagur, Daniel L. Krimmer, Melvyn Mitzner, Richard A. Nardi, Alan B.
Reis, Stuart M. Saft, and Richard Siegler. Their collective experience, insights, and
technical expertise are reflected in the statute as well as in the following discussion.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to describe the need that prompted enactment of the new
section, the thinking behind the specifics of the new provi-
sions, and the authors' expectations as to how the new law
will operate when it is put to use.
I. THE CONDOMINIUM FORM IN GENERAL
In order to provide a framework for the following discus-
sion, it will be helpful to set forth at this point a brief over-
view of the condominium form of ownership in New York
State. Upon its enactment in 1964, the Condominium Act
was in many ways a major pioneering effort as a matter of
substance, and it further served to popularize nationally this
important form of common interest ownership. However,
through the years, scrutiny of various provisions of the Con-
dominium Act occasioned by specific matters that arose from
time to time has uncovered areas of vagueness, ambiguity, or
self-contradiction. Indeed, some practitioners have found
that many statements, even those about basic tenets of the
law and its application, are subject to plausible challenge.
Nevertheless, the authors are comfortable with the following
description.
As its etymology suggests, the term "condominium" re-
fers to a certain kind of arrangement under which several
persons do (or at least can) share control of specific property.
In that sense, setting up a condominium is analogous to set-
ting up a recognized entity that is treated as a legal person
to own property, such as a corporation. That is, the estab-
lishment of the arrangement as to the subject property both
delineates the respective ownership rights of the participants
and also implicates a whole set of rules that govern the rela-
tionship of the participants inter se with respect to that
property. There are, of course, differences. Most fundamen-
tally, unlike a corporation (which can exist without owning
property), a condominium arrangement can exist only in re-
lation to specified property. In that sense, setting up a con-
dominium is akin to setting up a tenancy-in-common. The
terminology that is frequently used to express what happens
when property is submitted to the condominium form of
ownership-and which will be used in this article-is that a
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condominium "regime" is established as to that property.4
The tripartite essence of a condominium regime is as
follows: (1) conceptually, the subject property is divided into
parcels, (2) each participant severally owns one or more of
such parcels, and (3) the remainder of the property is co-
owned in fixed proportionate shares by all the participants
and is jointly administered by a governing body operating
under a defined set of rules.5
A. Establishment of Regime
In New York, a condominium regime is established as to
certain property by its owners recording a document (the
"declaration") that, among other things, describes the prop-
erty and states that the owners intend to submit it to the
provisions of the Condominium Act.6 Such submitted prop-
erty must include real property (or, in certain special cases, a
long-term leasehold) and may also include "other property,
personal or mixed."7 The recordation of the declaration is the
act that divides the submitted property into pieces and pro-
vides designation of them. Those certain portions of the
property that are described in the declaration as the "units"
are the subject of separate ownership and possession.8 The
balance of the submitted property constitutes the "common
elements."9 A vital point is that the common elements are
owned by all the unit owners together, somewhat like ten-
ants-in-common with an agreement not to partition. The
condominium declaration is required to set forth for each
unit either a percentage or a fraction (the aggregate of which
must be 100 percent (if percentages are listed) or one (if
fractions are listed)), and each unit has appurtenant to it
that proportionate undivided interest in the common ele-
ments.0 The Condominium Act provides that, except as oth-
4 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 777(5), 778(5) (McKinney 1996).
'"The characteristics of condominium ownership are individual ownership of a
unit, an undivided interest in designated common elements, and an agreement
among unit owners regulating the administration and maintenance of the property."
All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 38 (N.Y. 1986).
6 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-e(7), -(1), -n (McKinney 1989).
' Id. § 339-e(11).
'N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-e(14), -h, -n(4) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999).
9 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-e(3), -i (McKinney 1989).
10 See id §§ 339-e(5), -i, -n(5). The same term "common interest" (of a unit) is
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erwise provided, "[tlhe common elements shall remain undi-
vided and no right shall exist to partition or divide any
thereof."11 The Act also provides that "[each unit owner may
use the common elements in accordance with the purpose for
which they are intended, without hindering the exercise of or
encroaching upon the rights of the other unit owners." '
B. Administration of the Submitted Property
The Condominium Act clearly contemplates that the
submitted property (i.e., the units and the common elements)
is normally to be administered by a group known as the
"board of managers""3 chosen as set forth in a set of "by-
laws""' that must provide, among other things, for "[t]he
nomination and election of a board of managers," presumably
by the unit owners (although the statute does not say that),
and "the powers and duties of the board."5
Although a board of managers has certain powers over
the units, 6 such powers are of a limited nature." It is for this
used for two closely allied but different concepts, namely (i) the percentage or frac-
tion listed for that unit and (ii) the undivided portion of the common elements that
is appurtenant to that unit. The former is merely a number; the latter, a property
interest.
" Id. § 339-i(3).
12 Id. § 339-i(4).
'3 E.g., § 339-w. Some observers have noted that, curiously, there is no explicit
statement to that effect. However, because the Condominium Act goes on to de-
scribe the method of operation of this form of governance, it is obviously implied
that the condominium regime is to operate in this manner; cf id. (providing that the
board of managers (or the manager) "shall keep detailed, accurate records.., of the
receipts and expenditures arising from the operation of the property [and a] written
report summarizing such receipts and expenditures shall be rendered by the board
of managers [!] to all unit owners at least once annually"); see also Schoninger v.
Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass'n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523 (App. Div. 1987).
14 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-u (McKinney 1989) ("The operation of the prop-
erty shall be governed by by-laws, a true copy of which shall be annexed to the dec-
laration.").
15 Id. § 339-v(1)(a). Given the framework of the Condominium Act, one may
conclude that the only powers of a board of managers are those that are explicitly
granted either in the law itself or in the declaration or by-laws. This is in direct con-
trast to the doctrine governing other areas, such as the corporate area, where the
law implies those powers that are deemed necessary or desirable to carry out the
functioning of the entity. This distinction has created great difficulty for condomini-
ums whenever a third party (such as a lender) had to be convinced of a power's exis-
tence before that third party would act.
16 See, e.g., id. § 339-i(5) ("The unit owners shall have the irrevocable right, to be
exercised by the board of managers, to have access to each unit from time to time
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reason that, for example, courts have puzzled over whether it
is the unit owner rather than the board that is responsible
for code compliance within the unit. 8
In order to provide the board of managers with the nec-
essary funds to carry out its functions, the Condominium Act
confers on it a power to assess "common charges" against the
unit owners (generally in accordance with their respective
proportionate interests in the common elements) in order to
meet the "common expenses." 9 Suit may be maintained, evi-
dently by the board as a representative for all the unit own-
ers, "to recover a money judgment for unpaid common
charges."0 As an additional enforcement mechanism, the
Condominium Act provides that "[tlhe board of managers, on
behalf of the unit owners, shall have a lien on each unit for
the unpaid common charges thereof,"21 which is then, some-
during reasonable hours to the extent necessary for the operation of the property.").
It may be noted that, rather unhelpfully, the heading of the section in which the
provision appears is "Common elements."
17 Cf. id. § 339-h (granting each owner "exclusive ownership and possession of
his unit").
,' See, e.g., William B. May Co. v. Department of Health, 475 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226
(Sup. Ct. 1984) (involving a requirement to install window guards and holding that
the board of managers was "not responsible for bringing the units into compliance
with... the Health Code").
'9 New York Real Property Law section 339-e(2) says that " '[c] ommon charges'
means each unit's proportionate share of the common expenses in accordance with
its common interest," and New York Real Property Law section 339-m provides
that, subject to certain limited exceptions, "the common expenses shall be charged
to... the unit owners according to their respective common interests." New York
Real Property Law §339-e(4) says that " '[clommon expenses' means and includes...
[e]xpenses of operation of the property" and any other amounts so designated by or
pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the declaration, or the by-laws. New York
Real Property Law section 339-e(9) says that " '[olperation of the property means
and includes the administration and operation of the property and the maintenance,
repair and replacement of, and the making of any additions and improvements to,
the common elements." The use of the phrase "means and includes" in certain
places, as opposed to merely the word "means," would seem to indicate that the
stated content is not meant to be exclusive. If that is so, then other amounts might
also constitute "common expenses" that must be paid by the unit owners.
20 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §339-aa (McKinney Supp. 1999). This presents the
anomaly of a delinquent unit owner being both a plaintiff (albeit acting in the name
of a representative) and the defendant in the action. It is also noteworthy that the
personal liability provision is found only in a section headed "Lien for common
charges; duration; foreclosure." Id
' Id- § 339-z. The statute also provides that "[s]uch lien may be foreclosed by
suit authorized by and brought in the name of the board of managers, acting on be-
half of the unit owners." Id. § 339-aa. The section also provides, oddly, that under
certain circumstances the "unit owner shall be required to pay a reasonable rental
1999]
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what confusingly, said to "be effective from and after the fil-
ing" of a verified notice thereof.22
C. The Condominium Association
For decades, the Condominium Act avoided use of the
word "association" when referring to the unit owners as a
group,23 utilizing instead such awkward locutions as "the
board of managers, on behalf of the unit owners." Also,
some New York practitioners on occasion contended that the
unit owners of a condominium act only separately and never
as an organization.' Nevertheless, despite the Condomin-
ium Act's avoidance of the word, a New York condominium's
unit owners would seem always to have been a classic in-
stance of what is known in law as an "association."2 6 The
unit owners are a precisely known group of people having
defined voting rights, and the Condominium Act requires
that there be "meetings of the unit owners," refers to votes by
less than all of the unit owners that are binding on all of
them, and requires that there shall be "a president.., who
shall preside over the meetings.., of the unit owners," "a
secretary who shall keep a record wherein actions... of
meetings of the units owners shall be recorded," and "a
treasurer who shall keep the financial records and books of
for the unit." Id.
22 Id. It has been held that "the statutory lien for condominium common charges
(in favor of the condominium's Board of Managers) is entitled to priority over a pre-
viously recorded second mortgage." Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schnei-
der, 408 N.Y.S.2d 588, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The court observed that "the language
used... lacks a certain precision." Id. at 590.
2 In an interview, David Clurman, Esq., who was one of the drafters of the
original act, stated that the drafters were concerned that, under the tax law as it
then stood, the very use of the word "association" might unnecessarily subject the
unit owners to taxation as a corporation, a point that they wished to leave open to
the extent that they could.
24 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney Supp. 1999).
25 In most of the states that position is simply unavailable, inasmuch as their
statutes refer specifically to the "association" of unit owners. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:8B-9(k) (West 1989) ("The master deed shall set forth... [t]he name and
nature of the association."). Section 3-101 of the 1980 version of the Uniform Con-
dominium Act provides that "[a] unit owners' association must be organized no later
than the date the first unit in the condominium is conveyed."
26 Although the phrase "unincorporated association" is frequently used rather
than merely the single word "association"-and a true corporation is occasionally
referred to as an "association"-we shall use the term to refer only to organizations
that are not incorporated.
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account."27 Moreover, other New York statutes do use the
term "condominium association,"' and in 1998 the term fi-
nally appeared in the Condominium Act itself. 9 Accordingly,
the following discussion proceeds on the assumption that the
unit owners of a New York condominium do constitute an as-
sociation.30
This is obviously not the place for a full discussion of the
law of associations, but five points are worthy of special no-
tice.
First, associations are hardly rarae ayes in this State.
For example, every New York partnership is a form of asso-
ciation.31 Of course, that is not to say that all of the law of
partnerships applies to all associations; the New York Part-
nership Law contains many rules that have application only
to associations that are partnerships, and it remains to be
seen which of them will be imported into other areas.
Second, there are statutes that govern the procedural
aspects of suits by and against associations,32 and there is no
reason to think them inapplicable to condominium associa-
tions.33
27 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(1)(b), (c), (d), (e) (McKinney 1989).
28 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§352-eee(3), -eeee(3) (McKinney 1996); N.Y. PRIV.
HOUS. FIN. LAW §471(8) (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAw §38(1)
(McKinney 1989); cf N.Y. TAX LAW §606(g) (McKinney 1987) ("condominium man-
agement association").
2 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §339-kk (McKinney Supp. 1999), added by Laws 1998
Chapter 422, which moved the substance (and the term) from former New York
General Business Law section 352-e(2-d).
30 The statutory scheme makes clear that the governing body of such an asso-
ciation-the analogue of the board of directors of a corporation-is its board of man-
agers, and, in the authors' view, statutory references to a condominium's board of
managers acting on behalf of its unit owners are best understood as references to
action by the association.
31 New York Partnership Law § 10(1) (McKinney 1988) reads as follows: "A
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." One should not be misled by the fact that numerous New York
statutes refer to "partnerships" and "associations"--rather than to, say,
"partnerships and other associations"--any more than a reference to "squares and
rectangles" ought lead one to the false conclusion that a square is not a rectangle.
32 N.Y. GEN. ASS'Ns LAW art. 3 (McKinney 1994); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1025 (McKinney
1997).
"New York General Associations Law section 13 provides that "[any partner-
ship, or other company of persons, which has a president or treasurer, is deemed an
association within the meaning of this section," and the unit owners of a condomin-
ium have been held to be an association for this purpose. See Gillardi v. Country
Village Heights Condominium (Group I), 461 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
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Third, because a condominium association is neither a
limited liability company nor incorporated, 4 the unit owners
cannot count on it to provide protection against personal li-
ability.35 In that connection, it should be noted that, even if a
provision in the condominium documents stating a liability
limitation were to be effective as to contract liability," there
would seem to be no basis for any limitation of tort exposure
of the unit owners.5
Fourth, the mere fact that an organization is not incor-
porated does not prevent it from being treated as a corpora-
tion for income tax purposes. 8 It can thus sometimes be vital
to determine whether assets belong to the association or its
members.
Fifth, notwithstanding the ancient doctrine that, unlike
a corporation or a limited liability company, an association
"is not an artificial person, and has no existence independent
of its members"39-from which it is at times said to follow
that an association cannot own property-modern develop-
(holding that serving the president of a condominium constituted valid service of the
condominium under section 13 of the General Associations Law); see also Societe
Generale v. Charles & Co. Acquisition, Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (Sup. Ct.
1993).
*1 Although New York Real Property Law section 339-v(1)(a) permits a board of
managers to be incorporated, nothing in the Condominium Act addresses the pos-
sibility of an incorporated body consisting of all the unit owners. In many other
states, the association of unit owners must or may be incorporated. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-3(b) (West 1989) (stating that the association "may be incorpo-
rated or unincorporated").
35 See N.Y. GEN. ASS'NS LAW § 16 (McKinney 1994).31 Such a limitation, notwithstanding that it is a matter of public record, would
seem to be of doubtful efficacy. Would a corporation be permitted to obtain for itself
more time to pay its obligations by including in its certificate of incorporation a
provision that all persons dealing with it are deemed to have agreed that any pay-
ment need not be made by it for a period of years after payment would otherwise
have been due?
37 See, e.g., Paul E. Anderson & Thomas G. Cody, Tax Considerations of the
Condominium Sponsor and Purchaser, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 887, 907 (1974)
("Despite the fact that the unit owners have formed an association, the available
authorities maintain they remain jointly and severally liable for torts arising from
the use of the commonly owned property."). But cf. Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d
948, 951 (Tex. 1983) (holding, based on construction of Texas statute, unit owner
liable for only a pro rata portion of the damages). The authors expect that this
would become a very hot topic if a case arose in which liability greatly exceeded in-
surance coverage.
38 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1994) (including "associations" within the term
"corporation").
Martin v. Curran, 101 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. 1951).
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ments have drained that statement of virtually all content.
As noted above, the income tax law treats some associations
as the owners of property. Also, even though the Partnership
Law states that "[a] partner is co-owner with his partners of
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partner-
ship,4 ° the same section goes on to make it crystal clear that
such "ownership" is of no consequence. Among other things,
it provides that, as to any single partner's "right in specific
partnership property," it "is not assignable... is not subject
to attachment or execution.., vests [on his death] in the
surviving partner or partners... [and] is not subject to
dower, curtesy, or allowances to surviving spouses, heirs, or
next of kin."' The partnership, on the other hand, can alien-
ate all the partners' nominally separate ownership interests
in the property.4 Thus, in any meaningful sense it is the
partnership, and not the partners, that owns such property.
And, despite the absence of a specific statutory statement,
the same can properly be said of the property of associations
that are not partnerships. Indeed, this notion is so firmly in-
grained that it underlies many statutes43 and judicial opin-
ions." For present purposes, then, it will be assumed that a
40 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 51(1) (McKinney 1988).
41 Id. § 51(2).
42 Id § 21.
43 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. ASSNS LAW § 15 (McKinney 1994) (distinguishing be-
tween "personal or real property belonging to the association" and "personal or real
property... owned, jointly or in common, by all the members thereof); N.Y. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 1997) (distinguishing between property
"owned by" an association and property "held for" an association); N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-
105 (McKinney 1991) (referring to "the entire assets of a[n] unincorporated associa-
tion").
'In Martin v. Curran (wherein a sharply divided court held that an association
may not be sued for libel without a showing that every member authorized or rati-
fied the libel), both opinions indicated quite clearly that an association can own
property. See 101 N.E.2d at 686, 690-91. The four-judge majority opinion referred to
"the association's funds," id- at 689, and the three-judge minority opinion, after re-
ferring to "the property of the association" and "property belonging to the
[defendant] association," made the unchallenged statement that "Itihe Legislature
has provided that an unincorporated association may own personal or real property
General Associations Law, §§ 2, 6, 8, 15." Id. at 690-91. But cf Bradley v. O'Hare,
202 N.Y.S.2d 141, 153 (App. Div. 1960) ("[Tlitle to assets held by an unincorporated
association is not vested in the 'entity.' The association has no capacity to receive or
hold title. Instead, title is vested in the form of undivided interests in the members")
(citing 7 C.J.S. Associations § 14; William J. Isaacson, The Local Union and the In-
ternational, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 493,
504 (1950)).
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condominium association can own property.
D. Ownership of Other Property
Questions remain, though, about which assets belong to
a condominium association and can therefore be alienated or
encumbered by its board of managers. Beyond the question
of whether any of the submitted property (including any
submitted personalty) could conceivably be thought to belong
to the association, what of the common charges paid by the
unit owners? What of any interest earned on such funds
while in the hands of the board of managers? The situation
is even less clear as to the "common profits" (i.e., "the excess
of all receipts of the rents, profits and revenues from the
common elements remaining after the deduction of the com-
mon expenses"),5 which the Condominium Act says "shall
[with a possible exception for "non-residential units"] be dis-
tributed among... the unit owners according to their re-
spective common interests."8 Views also differ as to units
acquired by "the board of managers on behalf of all other
unit owners"47 or "[tihe board of managers, acting on behalf of
the unit owners. " " It is interesting that many practitioners,
including some counsel to title companies, take the view that
any such unit belongs to all the unit owners outside of any
association.49 However, even under that view, the question
remains as to the identity of the owner of the income if such
a unit is rented out.5 Other amounts-such as certain dam-
age insurance proceeds"k-probably do not belong to any as-
4' N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(6) (McKinney 1989).
46 Id. § 339-m.
47 Id. § 339-x (allowing a unit owner to convey both his unit and its appurtenant
common interest to the board to exempt himself from later accruing common
charges).
' Id. § 339-aa (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999) (allowing the board, subject to
restrictions, to purchase a unit at a foreclosure sale pursuant to a lien for common
charfes).
It is for that reason that a power of attorney authorizing the board to deal
with acquired units is normally required from every incoming unit owner.
One of the permissible provisions in the by-laws is "[tlhe form by which the
board of managers, acting on behalf of the unit owners ... may acquire and hold any
unit and lease, mortgage and convey the same." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(2)(c)
(McKinney 1989). Similar language is found in section 339-aa.
51 See id. § 339-cc (McKinney 1989). Somewhat confusing as to the issue of in-
surance is the requirement of section 339-bb that, if required by condominium
documentation or the unit owners, it is the "board of managers" that is to insure the
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sociation that may exist. In short, the Condominium Act
seems to contemplate that (excluding, of course, the submit-
ted property) at least some assets belong to an association
and some may belong to unit owners outside of any associa-
tion.
Whatever the correct theory, in practice all of the non-
submitted assets (including any income from the common
elements) are ordinarily treated as though they belonged to
an association rather than to the unit owners. It is common
knowledge that unit owners do not report on their own tax
returns their aliquot shares of income from the renting out of
a portion of the common elements, interest paid on a bank
account controlled by the board of managers, or even any
part of the profit realized on the resale of a unit acquired by
the board of managers "on behalf of the unit owners." All
such income has universally been reported by an entity, on
financial statements as well as on income tax returns.
II. BOARDS' BORROWING POWER UNDER PRIOR LAW
Prior to the addition of section 339-jj, there was no ex-
plicit mention in the Condominium Act of any power that a
board of managers might have to borrow funds. It is true
that some declarations and/or by-laws purported to confer
such a power-and it could have been argued that any sub-
sequently-acquiring unit owner was bound by the statement
of such a power-but, as a general rule, lenders were unwill-
ing to rely on any such debatable authority.52
Moreover, especially where the relied-upon document set
forth a limitation of each unit owner's responsibility for re-
payment, lenders generally were unwilling to advance funds
(even assuming arguendo that they could be satisfied that
the board had the power, as agent for the unit owners, to
bind them personally to third persons), inasmuch as recover-
ing the loaned funds might necessitate pursuing numerous
claims.
Such a concern could have been obviated, of course, if a
building, without further specification as to the role of the board in this regard as
representative of the unit owners or otherwise.
52 There might even have been an issue, especially if one questions the existence
of an association, as to whether a given board of managers would have authority to
enter into any agreement binding on a subsequently constituted board.
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board of managers had any substantial collateral to offer.
But that rarely, if ever, occurred. As noted above, the units
belong to the unit owners, and it is indisputable that a board
as such has no power to encumber them.53 A priori, one
might have entertained a different view as to at least some of
the common elements," but the statute is explicit on the
point: unless consent is obtained from every unit owner, "no
lien of any nature shall... arise or be created against the
common elements."5 Even if boards had command of prop-
erty that constituted neither units nor common elements
(whether or not within an association), it would certainly
have been the exception rather than the rule that a sizable
amount could have been realized by utilizing the value in
such property.
Prior to the enactment of section 339-jj, the Condomin-
ium Act did allow for one method of provision of security,
which existed in order to assure payments to contractors to
encourage them to provide materials and services prior to
payment. This can be seen as a limited and indirect form of
borrowing. Thus, section 339-1(2) has long provided that in
the case of:
[L]abor performed on or materials furnished to the common
elements ... at the express request or with the consent of the
manager, managing agent or board of managers... all common
63The statement in the text is not meant to cover the situation in which a board
of managers acquires a unit. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
5' As to some of the common elements (e.g., a roof, a heating system, or an ele-
vator), one can easily understand the Legislature's reluctance to permit a foreclo-
sure sale. Nor is it likely that a lender would want to find itself in a position of
forcing unit owners to pay a toll charge for the use of such items. A closer question
is presented as to certain separable amenities, as, for example, an outdoor swim-
ming pool.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(1) (McKinney 1989). Lest even that clear state-
ment be subject to misconstruction, the statute goes on to say that "liens may arise
or be created only against the several units and their respective common interests."
Id. (emphasis added). The Legislature's intent is further evidenced by the Condo-
minium Act's method of dealing with needed repairs to the common elements. See
infra text accompanying note 56. Also, it would seem unreasonable to construe the
language as permitting the prohibition to be overridden by a provision in the con-
dominium documents, in view of the places in which the Condominium Act permits
contrary provisions where authorized by the declaration or by both the declaration
and the by-laws. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §§ 339-i(2) (McKinney 1989) (the
declaration only; the declaration and by-laws), 339-m (the declaration and by-laws),
339-z (the declaration only). But cf id. § 339-i() (including the statement that
"[a]ny provision to the contrary shall be null and void").
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charges received and to be received by the board of managers,
and the right to receive such funds, shall constitute trust funds
for the purpose of paying the cost of such labor or materials...
and the same shall be expended first for such purpose before
expending any part of the same for any other purpose."
56
The kinds of workers and suppliers dealt with in this
provision would normally be providing services or materials
to owners of real property where they would have had re-
course to a mechanic's lien. However, the drafters of the
Condominium Act decided to prohibit the liening of the
common elements by a laborer or materials provider. It is
thus clear that it was believed that such a provider would be
willing to wait for his money so long as he knew that the
members of the board of managers would be subjecting
themselves to criminal prosecution for converting trust funds
if they paid someone else first. In practice, though, few con-
tractors (even assuming that they were aware of and had
confidence in the trust fund provision) could be found who
were in a position to fund major work and receive payment
over a length of time comparable to the period over which a
loan would ordinarily be repaid.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF INABILITY TO BORROW
In the real world, then, boards of managers, as a rule,
simply could not borrow large amounts of money. How, then,
were they to fund major expenditures? In theory, of course,
they could rely on existing reserves established in connection
with the condominium's creation or accumulated over the
years by collecting more in common charges than had to be
expended currently.57 However, that did not always happen
and, even where it did, the funds on hand usually turned out
to be inadequate to fulfill the needs presented. As a result,
in all too many cases, large outlays were being deferred as
long as possible and, when they became unavoidable, could
be funded only by assessments against the several unit own-
ers, which often imposed significant hardships and some-
times were simply uncollectible.
The prevailing situation thus led to both deteriorating
58 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(2) (McKinney 1989).
57 See id. § 339-v(2)(b) (authorizing the creation of reserves if so provided in the
by-laws). But cf id. § 339-m (mandating the distribution of common profits).
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physical plants and significant financial strains on people
who could little afford them. Matters worsened at an acceler-
ating pace as periods of condominium ownership lengthened.
It was becoming increasingly clear that it would be
highly desirable for a board of managers to be able to raise
money by borrowing, particularly by obtaining an ordinary
loan from an institutional lender.58 However, as noted above,
there were two major obstacles. First, there was no clear
authority to borrow. Second, even if attorneys involved in a
particular transaction could responsibly conclude that a par-
ticular board of managers under the condominium documen-
tation involved had the power generically to engage in bor-
rowing and had the authority to enter into a particular loan
transaction, there remained the practical question of
whether any meaningful security could be granted to a
lender.
One possible source of security was the income stream to
be received by the board of managers, principally the com-
mon charges to be paid by the unit owners and in some cases
rentals to be produced by the common elements. Again, the
pre-1997 New York statute did not lend itself to a clear in-
terpretation that there was power vested in a board of man-
agers to assign this income stream.
Potential lenders also questioned how a lender could en-
force its interests in any collateral that might be pledged to
it. Perhaps more important was the concern of lenders that
they would be at the mercy of recalcitrant unit owners who
would fail to pay their common charges or of a recalcitrant
board that would simply refuse to levy the necessary charges
or to pay over the required debt service. As noted above, a
board of managers has a right to enforce the personal obli-
gation of a unit owner to pay his common charges, as well as
the powerful protection of a lien against the unit.59 However,
58 This kind of financing is readily available where the cooperative apartment
corporation form of ownership is employed, inasmuch as, in such a legal structure,
the corporation ordinarily can borrow because (i) a board of directors operates under
the well-known general powers afforded under corporate law and (ii) the borrower
owns meaningful real property that can serve as collateral. See Matthew J. Leeds,
Executive Summary of Proposed Condominium Lending Statute, in TITLE IN-
SURANCE 1996: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 749, 752 (PLI Real Est. Practice Course
Handbook Series 1996).
59 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
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the statute did not incorporate a mechanism for the assign-
ment of these rights for the protection of a lender, even if one
could be found that was willing to run the risk of having to
enforce multiple small claims.
As to the issue of a defaulting board of managers, a
lender would have had to take into account the fact that a
board of managers is normally composed of non-professionals
who are governing their own homes and those of their neigh-
bors. The reality is that a board of managers can be expected
to act as a parochial and political body responding to ex-
tremely personal needs and to the concerns of its constitu-
ency. Thus, potential lenders were justifiably reluctant to
part with funds absent some means of assuring themselves
that the repayment obligations of their borrowers would be
enforceable in a practical manner.
IV. SECTION 339-JJ
Given this legal and political background, in 1996 the
New York State Bar Association's Real Property Section
Condominiums and Cooperatives Committee developed an
initiative to propose legislation that would, by creating a
statutory frame of certainty and protection for lenders who
wish to engage in such lending, allow boards of managers to
borrow money. This initiative received the endorsement of
the Real Property Section and ultimately became a spon-
sored legislative proposal of the association itself. The pro-
posal then gained the support of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Attorney General Dennis Vacco's
Martin Act Task Force, and important industry groups such
as the Council of New York Cooperatives and Condomini-
ums. Bills based on this proposal were submitted by State
Senator Roy Goodman60 and Assemblyman Daniel L. Feld-
man6' and were, in slightly amended form, passed without
negative vote by both houses of the Legislature, but were
then (for a reason discussed below) vetoed by Governor
Pataki on July 15, 1997. However, a slightly revised ver-
sion was shortly thereafter submitted as part of the Gover-
Go See S. 3544, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
61 See A. 6658, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
62 See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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nor's own legislative package' and was rapidly approved by
a unanimous vote of the Legislature' and signed into law on
August 26, 1997.
The new provisions read as follows:
Section 339-jj. Borrowing by board of managers
1. To the extent authorized by the declaration or the by-laws,
the board of managers, on behalf of the unit owners, may incur
debt. In addition, subject to any limitations set forth in the dec-
laration or the by-laws, the board of managers, on behalf of the
unit owners, may incur debt for any of the purposes enumerated
in paragraph (b) of subdivision two of section three hundred
thirty-nine-v of this article, provided that (a) such debt is in-
curred no earlier than the fifth anniversary of the first convey-
ance of a unit and (b) the incurrence of such debt shall require
the consent of a majority in common interest of the unit owners.
2. In connection with a debt incurred by it, the board of manag-
ers, on behalf of the unit owners, may (a) assign the rights in
and to receive future income and common charges, (b) create a
security interest in, assign, pledge, mortgage or otherwise en-
cumber funds or other real or personal property that it holds, (c)
agree that, to the extent of any amounts due under any of the
provisions of the agreements under which the debt was incurred
and subject to the provisions of subdivision two of section three
hundred thirty-nine-/ of this article, all common charges re-
ceived and to be received by it, and the right to receive such
funds, shall constitute trust funds for the purpose of paying
such debt and the same shall be expended for such purpose be-
fore expending any part of the same for any other purpose, and
(d) agree that at the lender's direction it will increase common
charges to the extent necessary to pay any amount when due
under any of the provisions of the agreements under which the
debt was incurred. The preceding sentence shall not be con-
strued to authorize the board of managers to create a lien on the
common elements. Any such assignment may provide that, in
the event of a default, the lender shall have the right of the
board of managers to file liens in the lender's name on units for
unpaid common charges pursuant to sections three hundred
thirty-nine-z and three hundred thirty-nine-aa of this article
and the right to foreclose such liens pursuant to section three
See S. 5751, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
64 See Matthew J. Leeds & Joel E. Miller, New Addition to Article 9-B Permits
Condominiums to Borrow, N.Y. L.J. 5 (Aug. 13, 1997).
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hundred thirty-nine-aa of this article.
3. Nothing in this section shall impair rights under any loan or
other agreement existing prior to the effective date of this sec-
tion or limit any right or power that a board of managers would
otherwise have."
A. Overview
Section 339-j has three subdivisions, each with its own
function. The first subdivision is intended to provide clear
legal authority for a board of managers to incur debt; the
second is intended to allow a board to furnish to a lender
meaningful assurances that the debt will be repaid; and the
third is intended to ensure that the new legislation is not
construed so as to diminish any borrowing power that might
previously have existed. The three subdivisions are dis-
cussed separately in the following paragraphs.
B. Subdivision 1-Introduction
This subdivision has two sentences, each of which ad-
dresses a different situation-namely (1) the situation in
which the condominium documents say that borrowing
power exists and (2) the situation in which the documents
are silent or insufficient on the point. The two sentences-
which were intended to operate independently of one an-
other66-will be discussed separately below.
Preliminarily, though, it should be noted that the two
sentences have something very important in common: each
of them authorizes a board of managers, under certain cir-
cumstances, to "incur debt," which incurrence is said to be
"on behalf of the unit owners." Each of those phrases de-
serves some discussion.
The phrase "incur debt" was meant to have a plain lan-
guage meaning, which would normally be a reference to a
conventional loan under which money is received either at
the time of closing or as later drawn down, perhaps condi-
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-jj (McKinney Supp. 1999).
' The drafters believed that the phrase "[in addition" would make it impossible
to mistake that intention. However, some have expressed the view that all of the
limitations set forth in the second sentence apply to the first sentence. Although
there is no basis for such a position, it may be advisable, if the section is amended,
to place each of the sentences in a separate subdivision.
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tioned on the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more fu-
ture events. It would also apply to obligations to pay over a
period of time or at a later date for property or services pre-
viously obtained.
It is entirely clear that both sentences permit a board to
bind the unit owners to personal liability for repayment of
the borrowed funds. It can be argued that, unless the
lender agrees otherwise, such liability would be for the entire
amount borrowed rather than for only a portion thereof.'
However, it is not entirely clear whether the reference is to
liability on the part of an association (which, as noted above,
would not provide a liability shield in any event) or on the
part of the unit owners directly.69 It is to be expected that
loan documents will not attempt to resolve the point, but will
merely track the statutory language.
Notwithstanding that the unit owners would have the
ultimate liability in either case, the point is an important
one because, if the liability is that of an association in the
first instance and that association is treated as a corporation
for income-tax purposes (which is almost always the case),
then existing law might deny deductions to the unit owners
even if all other requirements were met.
Although the argument runs that the liability is that of
the unit owners directly (and such an interpretation would
be preferable in terms of defending income tax deductions),
the authors expect that practitioners will often choose the
easier reporting course and claim deductions for an associa-
tion rather than have each unit owner claim his own deduc-
tion. Among other things, such a procedure would be consis-
tent with the established practice under which income is
reported by associations rather than unit owners.
67 The mere fact of personal liability is not novel. As noted above, unit owners
have always been personally liable for their own common charges, which include
any amounts not paid by other unit owners, so that, conceivably, all common ex-
penses could fall on a single unit owner if all other unit owners failed to pay their
common charges.
8 If that is correct, then it will be of small comfort to a member of the board of
managers (who is almost always a unit owner) that the statute makes clear that he
is acting only in a representative capacity for the unit owners and will as such
member have no personal liability to repay the debt.
" Either way, there would presumably be a right of contribution against any
unit owner who paid less than his proper share.
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Although some attorneys have stated that they intend to
take the position that the new law does not itself impose di-
rect personal liability on the unit owners for whom a board is
acting, it is unquestionably possible that such liability will
be found to exist. Accordingly, some attorneys have sug-
gested that, on the borrower side, they will request provi-
sions limiting the exposure of each unit owner to his aliquot
share of the borrowed amount. Notwithstanding the backup
nature of such liability in the minds of lenders, it remains to
be seen whether a lender will agree to a situation in which it
becomes possible for the burden of a unit owner's default to
fall on it rather than on the other unit owners (who would
clearly have to supply the missing funds if the assessment
route were to be taken).
There are yet other questions that some day may have to
be answered. For instance, if the repayment liability is that
of the unit owners directly (rather than through an associa-
tion), can it be shed by a unit owner's disposing of his unit?
Conversely, is an incoming unit owner directly responsible to
repay a previous borrowing?
It deserves emphasis that all of the above issues arise
regardless of under which of the two sentences of the first
subdivision the debt is incurred.
C. Subdivision 1-Document-Based Authority
As discussed above, some condominium documentation
purports to authorize the board of managers to borrow funds,
but conservative lenders were fearful that such authorization
might be ineffectual on the ground that it went beyond what
the Condominium Act permitted.0 The first sentence of sec-
tion 339-jj(1) was designed to put such fears to rest by stat-
ing unequivocally that, to the extent stated in the condomin-
ium's declaration or by-laws, such power does exist.
The statute clearly states that the authorization to incur
debt may be found in either the declaration or the by-laws; it
need not be in both. In view of the fact that in certain situa-
tions it might be easier to amend the declaration proper
rather than to amend the by-laws (and, conceivably, vice-
70 See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 52.
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
versa),7 the point may be an important one in some cases.
On the other hand, the first sentence of section 339-ij
does nothing to help the situation where the declaration and
the by-laws are both silent on the point. Hence, a power
grounded in this first sentence may be referred to as
"document-based" authority.
As suggested above, nothing in the sentence-or else-
where-limits this grant of authority to documentation that
pre-existed the effective date of section 339-jj. It follows that,
in theory at least, existing documentation could be amended
at any time to increase the board's power. It is a fact of life,
though, that, especially because condominium documents are
normally amendable only by a super-majority of the unit
owners, inattention and/or inertia frequently frustrate the
adoption of even wholly unobjectionable beneficial changes.
That is the raison d'8tre for the second sentence of section
339-Jj(1).
D. Subdivision 1-Statute-Based Authority
The second sentence of section 339-j(1) was included in
recognition of the fact that condominium documents fre-
quently have no provision whatsoever about borrowing,
whether to authorize it or to prohibit it. Hence, a board's
power grounded on this second sentence does not depend on
the existence of any language in the condominium docu-
ments and may be referred to as "statute-based" authority.
Although the drafters recognized the practical need to
furnish a board of managers with borrowing power where it
is not feasible to amend the declaration and/or by-laws to
provide for such authority, they believed that it would be
both unwise and unnecessary to grant unlimited authority.
There are, therefore, four very significant limitations on a
board's statute-based authority. Those limitations are dis-
cussed below.
71 New York Real Property Law section 339-u provides that "[nio modification of
or amendment to the by-laws shall be valid unless set forth in an amendment to the
declaration," and New York Real Property Law section 339-v(1)j) provides that, ex-
cept in a wholly nonresidential condominium, at least a two-thirds majority of the
unit owners is necessary to amend the by-laws. New York Real Property Law sec-
tion 339-n(9), on the other hand, provides merely that the declaration must set forth
"[tihe method by which the declaration may be amended, consistent with the provi-
sions of [the Condominium Act]."
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Before that discussion, though, it bears repeating that
the limitations on statute-based authority are wholly irrele-
vant to document-based authority; a board that has docu-
ment-based authority need not concern itself with any of the
limitations on statute-based authority. There is, of course,
nothing that would prevent a lender from imposing its own
restrictions-including any that might have been inspired by
the limitations on statute-based authority-but nothing in
the statute requires that result.
a. The Not-Contrary-to-the-Documents Limitation. If the
declaration or the by-laws set forth any limitation on the
board's borrowing power, that limitation must be respected.
However, mere silence of the declaration and by-laws on this
point should not be taken as a bar to borrowing based on
statute-based authority; in fact, as indicated above, precisely
the contrary result was intended by the statute.'
Similar to the possible extension by amendment of any
document-based authority, it was intended that the unit
owners (if they can assemble the necessary support) be able,
by amendment, to curtail for the future even the statute-
based authority of the board. It is recognized that this is of
no comfort to a unit owner who both (1.) relied on the docu-
ments' silence as to borrowing power and (2.) is unable to
muster the votes for a limiting amendment. However, there
can be no doubt that, absent a limiting provision in the con-
dominium documents, every unit owner has always been
subject to the board's power to impose a lump-sum assess-
ment, which in many ways is a more objectionable power.
Also, a board's statute-based authority is in any event cir-
cumscribed by the other three limitations.
b. The Purpose Limitation. The purpose or purposes for
which statute-based debt is incurred must be among those
enumerated in section 339-v(2)(b), which provides that the
by-laws may contain "[pirovisions governing the payment,
collection and disbursement of fimds, including reserves, to
provide for major and minor maintenance, repairs, additions,
improvements, replacements, working capital, bad debts and
unpaid common expenses, depreciation, obsolescence and
72 Absolute silence is critically different from a conditional grant of a power. For
instance, a grant of power conditioned on two-thirds consent is fairly read as a pro-
hibition absent such consent.
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similar purposes."3 It is recognized that, although section
339-ji was primarily intended to facilitate borrowing for capi-
tal work that must be performed, boards and attorneys will
find broader application of the language of section
339-v(2)(b). All the same, this purpose limitation does pre-
vent the second sentence from providing unlimited justifica-
tion for a board to borrow. Also, lenders who are concerned
that authorization remains too broad can draft appropriate
provisions in their own lending documents. In any event,
lenders will probably police (by affidavit, control of funds, or
otherwise) the actual application of funds, using either
mechanisms that develop in this area in the future or the
time-tested mechanisms already in use with respect to lines
of credit and construction lending.
c. The Not-During-the-First-Five-Years Limitation. Stat-
ute-based debt may not be incurred before the fifth anniver-
sary of the first conveyance of a unit (the time not being
measured from the date of recording the declaration, which
can be prior to the time when the condominium is actually
operating).
This limitation was the subject of considerable debate
during the early stages of the drafting process. The partici-
pants whose viewpoint ultimately prevailed felt (either
philosophically on their own behalves or in order to generate
a proposal that they believed might be more attractive to the
legislature) that the law should not provide a means by
which condominium declarants, who might remain in control
for a period of time, could commit any non-consenting unit
owner to repay debt, regardless of the wishes of the other
unit owners and the worthiness of the purpose. Those par-
ticipants were concerned that declarants in control of a debt-
incurring board might find some way to misappropriate the
borrowed funds or that the sponsor of an offering plan could
somehow hide a sin such as an infirmity in the original
73 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(2)(b) (McKinney 1989). The reference in section
339-jj to section 339-v(2)(b) merely incorporates the list of items in that subdivision
instead of repeating them in the new section. It would obviously be wrong to read
section 339-i as requiring separate amendment of the by-laws in order to authorize
a statute-based financing. Also, obviously, it was not contemplated that a board
(along with a majority in common interest of the unit owners, of course) could use
section 339-Jj statute-based authority to borrow money for some purpose for which
the board is not otherwise authorized to expend funds.
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budget. They believed that statute-based authority ought
not be available to the boards of new condominium regimes,
where, they argued, it would be less likely that financing
would be necessary and more likely that inexperienced
boards might mishandle the power. They also asserted that,
absent a document provision, it would be undesirable to al-
low a board to increase common charges near the time of in-
ception of the condominium regime, when common charges
are initially established.
Once the decision was reached to deny statute-based
authority to boards of newly organized condominiums, five
years seemed like a reasonable length of time. It also tied in
with the policies of the New York State Department of Law,
which militated against allowing the sponsor of a condomin-
ium offering to exercise control for more than five years.74
Unfortunately, the inclusion of this absolute limitation,
even if well-intentioned, may force some boards with press-
ing legitimate needs and majority consent (and no declarant
presence) to choose between the trauma of amending the
condominium documents or subjecting the unit owners to
lump-sum assessments.
On the other hand, the efficacy of the not-during-the-
first-five-years limitation is open to serious question. First of
all, it applies only where the declarant both (1.) was not
clever enough to include borrowing power in the condomin-
ium documents and (2.) no longer has sufficient power to
amend those documents to insert such power ( it being the
case that declarants who have document-based authority
need not concern themselves with any limitation on statute-
based authority. Moreover, even the worst-intentioned de-
clarant-controlled board almost always has the power to
achieve its ends by the more draconian means of levying
lump-sum assessments.
d. The Majority-Must-Consent Limitation. Statute-based
authority does not exist unless the borrowing has been con-
sented to by a majority in interest of the unit owners. It was
recognized that, because in some condominiums the common
interests appurtenant to the various units are not all the
same, the statutory threshold might on occasion be met even
74 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 13, §§ 20.3(u), 23.3(w) (1998).
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over the objections of a numerical majority of the unit own-
ers. However, in view of the fact that the burden of repaying
a borrowing falls on the unit owners in proportion to their
respective common interests, it was felt that a common in-
terest test would be fairer than an absolute number test. In
any event, a lender desiring to obtain a broader consensus is
free to require consents from a higher percentage and/or to
impose an absolute-number requirement of any dimension.
Use of the term "consent" was intended to make clear
that a formal vote at a meeting of the unit owners is not nec-
essary. It is expected that, in practice, management will so-
licit written consents from unit owners, and it is recognized
that repeated requests will often be required. Certainly, a
formal recorded vote at a meeting of unit owners would be
ideal documentation of the necessary consent, but the re-
quired consent would still be that of a majority in interest of
all the unit owners, not merely that of a majority in interest
of those voting or even of those taking part in the meeting.
Because nothing in the statute requires that the neces-
sary consent be obtained prior to the borrowing, it will be
theoretically possible for a borrowing to be validated retro-
actively, analogously to how corporate shareholders occa-
sionally ratify past acts of a board of directors. It is to be ex-
pected, though, that such after-the-fact consent will be
employed only if doubt has arisen about the effectiveness of
an earlier attempted consent.
A question may be raised as to whether the statutory re-
quirement is met by a blanket consent to borrowing in gen-
eral. A negative answer is suggested by, among other things,
the statute's use of the term "such debt,"76 but there would
seem to be no objection to a single consent to several de-
scribed borrowings. Certainly, careful lenders will require
unambiguous consent with respect to each loan transaction
in which statute-based authority is relied upon.
The version of proposed section 339-ji that was vetoed by
Governor Pataki contained a consent limitation that was less
restrictive than the one that became law.77 Under the earlier
version, consent was required only if the total borrowing by a
U' N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-ji(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
76 Id.
' See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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board would exceed a certain determinable amount, which
was equal to $5,000 multiplied by the number of units. The
bill's drafters believed (and presumably the Legislature
shared that belief) that the committing of the unit owners to
repay over time such relatively small amounts-less than
$5,000 for the owner of a unit with a smaller-than-average
common interest-would not justify the trouble and expense
of obtaining consents, particularly in large developments
that were home to persons of modest means. The Governor's
veto memorandum78 suggested his concern that committing
unit owners to repay even such sums, notwithstanding that
they could be the subject of a direct up-front lump-sum as-
sessment, would be unfair to unit owners who were not in-
78 Governor's Veto Memorandum #15 (N.Y. A. 6658-A, 220th Sess.), N.Y. LEGIS.
ANN. 485 (1997), the body of which is as follows:
This bill would amend the Real Property Law to allow the board of manag-
ers of a condominium to borrow funds on behalf of unit owners. A board of
managers would be authorized to borrow up to $5,000 per unit for capital
purposes, subject to any limitations set forth in the declaration or the by-
laws. Borrowing in excess of $5,000 per unit would be allowed on the con-
sent of a majority of unit owners. Additional borrowing would be author-
ized to the extent permitted by the declaration and by-laws. The loans
authorized by this bill would be secured by the board's right to receive fu-
ture common charges, and lenders could require a condominium's common
charges to be increased to levels sufficient to repay such loans.
I am disapproving this legislation because it fails to include adequate
safeguards to protect condominiums owners. As written, the bill would al-
low a condominium's board of managers to incur $5,000 of indebtedness on
behalf of each unit owner without the owner's consent. Indeed, the bill does
not even require notice to the affected owners. While the vast majority of
condominium boards would use the borrowing authority provided by this
legislation in a prudent manner, an improvident board could borrow sub-
stantial sums on behalf of unit owners for an ill-advised improvement proj-
ect, thereby saddling the owners with exorbitant common charges for years
to come. Moreover, the bill's $5,000 threshold is excessive. In many parts of
the State, $5,000 can represent a considerable percentage of the value of a
condominium unit and an even greater percentage of the owner's equity in
his or her home.
While the bill's so-called "safe harbor" provisions-which allow the decla-
ration and by-laws to be amended to limit the board's borrowing author-
ity--give owners an opportunity to regulate borrowing, I am concerned
that condominium owners may be unaware of the new authority conferred
on their board of managers until the borrowing occurs. At that point, it
would be too late for the owners to act. Further, if owner consent is not re-
quired, the bill should contain some form of oversight by the Attorney Gen-
eral or other responsible governmental entity.
The bill is disapproved.
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volved in a vote over the subject. As noted above, the revised
bill accommodated the Governor's view. It is hoped that po-
tential borrowers will not be discouraged from entering into
these smaller loan transactions (and thus be forced to fall
back on lump-sum exactions) because of the disproportionate
burdens and expenses of administration that will pertain to
borrowing smaller amounts.
E. Subdivision 2-Introduction
This subdivision of section 339-j allows a board of man-
agers to provide a lender with meaningful assurances that a
loan properly incurred by the board will be repaid. It applies
to all such debt, there being no difference for this purpose
whether the debt is being incurred pursuant to document-
based power or statute-based power.
Prior to separate discussions of the four different kinds of
repayment assurances that are authorized-some undoubt-
edly stronger than others (and, therefore, of different utilities
to lenders in different circumstances)-it should be noted
that the use of the word "may" makes clear that each of the
four is permissive and, in theory at least, loan documents
could include none or any number of those assurances.79
Additionally, the listing was not meant to be exclusive; so
long as no prohibition is violated, a lender is free to insist on
other safeguards as well.
F. Subdivision 2-Assignment of Income
A board now has power to assign to a lender any or all of
its rights "in and to receive future income and common
charges.""° Presumably, such an assignment would not be
absolute; rather, it would be in the nature of an assignment
of rents, to become operative only in the event of a default.
The phrase "future income" was intended to be broadly
construed so as to include all receipts of any kind, so long as
they are within the control of the board. The word "income"
was not intended to have a technical tax meaning; rather, it
was meant to cover all items that would be shown as money
79 It follows, of course, that there is no basis for reading any of the now-available
forms of assurance into documents, whenever signed, that did not or in the future
do not specifically provide therefor.
so N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-jj(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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coming into the condominium in a typical budget or financial
statement. Examples might include rents from commercial
tenants, fees from concessionaires, and, in some cases, liti-
gation awards.
The specific mention of common charges was to forestall
any contention that "income" might not include them. It is
the statutorily defined term that was intended to be refer-
enced, and all common charges of any type were meant to be
covered, including special assessments as well as regular
periodic charges.
The subdivision's last sentence allows a board to confer
upon a lender the right, in the event of a default under the
loan documents, to step into the board's shoes in order to se-
cure and enforce a lien for unpaid common charges.8' In such
a case, the lender will be able to file the same lien that the
board would otherwise have been able to file, except that the
lien will be in the name of the lender, which will then be in a
position to foreclose on the unit in the same manner as the
board would have been able to foreclose in accordance with
the provisions of section 339-aa. Of course, a unit owner's
common charges are limited to his applicable portion of
common expenses. Under normal circumstances, that would
mean that the total liened amount would reflect only his per-
centage of common interest multiplied by the amount of the
debt service (or, on maturity, of the loan) due. Thus, under
this mechanism a single unit owner would not have to pay
an amount greater than would be based on his share of the
loan, except that, like any other condominium expenses, if
some unit owners did not pay their shares, the deficiency
would then become an expense of all the other unit owners.82
8' A present assignment of any liening rights that may arise in the future would
seem to be sufficient without any necessity of a separate assignment after the oc-
currence of a deficiency. If it should turn out to be otherwise, it is expected that as-
signments in blank and powers of attorney will become part of every set of condo-
minium board loan documents.
It is recognized that the enforcement of liens by a lender against recalcitrant
unit owners for the non-payment of common charges will be an unusual situation.
Certainly, lenders are not going to view numerous separate foreclosures as their
primary remedy. In addition, lenders will recognize that they are enforcing a pay-
ment of common charges, which is subordinate to a first mortgage of record on the
unit. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney Supp. 1999); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Board of Managers, 616 N.E.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. 1993) (finding legislative intent to
subordinate common charges to such a mortgage). Although it would be unusual for
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G. Subdivision 2-Granting of Liens
A board now has power to grant a lender a lien on any or
all of the "funds or other real or personal property that it
holds."' The word "holds" was intended to make clear that
the power extends to any property in which the board has a
right or that the board controls. Indeed, the drafters under-
stood the "hold" concept to have such a broad reach that they
deemed it advisable for the statute to state that the power is
not to be construed as extending to any property that is part
of the common elements (the liening of which still requires
the unanimous consent of the unit owners).' Subject to that
limitation, a board can now grant liens on such property as
bank accounts, certificates of deposit, financial instruments,
reserve funds, building equipment, snow blowers, uniforms,
light bulbs, etc., as well as any units that the board may
have acquired.'
Although it is to be expected that lenders will not fail to
acquire liens on all possible property, a board will rarely be
able to borrow a sizable amount on the basis of this kind of
assurance alone.
H. Subdivision 2-Creation of Trust Fund
A board now has power to commit common charges to
the payment of a debt by agreeing that, subject to certain
limitations, the funds are to be held in trust for that purpose
and that board members risk civil action and even criminal
sanctions if they use such funds for any other purpose while
there are amounts due and unpaid under the loan docu-
ments. This mechanism parallels the protection given to
contractors under section 339-1(2), where the treatment of
common charges as trust funds is provided as security for
such creditors in the special framework of a condominium
because the normal real property rights of a mechanic's lien
a lender to determine the creditworthiness of all of the unit owners, in smaller con-
dominiums appropriate due diligence might encompass a reasonable survey of unit
owners and their financial wherewithals.
8 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-jj(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
8Among other possibilities, such an acquisition might be by a foreclosure under
section 339-aa, by a conveyance from a unit owner who abandoned his unit under




are unavailable." Similarly, where a board would want to
borrow money (but a real estate mortgage cannot be granted
because of the special nature of condominium ownership),
lenders can now be given important security, which they
would need in order to consider these loans as secured loans
so as to encourage them to make funds available to qualified
condominiums.
The new provision tracks precisely the language that has
existed, and has survived unchallenged, for thirty-five years
in section 339-(2). It is to be assumed that the two trust
fund provisions will be interpreted similarly.
Like its model, the provision's language is broad and in-
clusive, covering not only common charges already "received"
but also "common charges.., to be received.., and the right
to receive such funds."87 However, the new section also
makes clear that any section 339-jj(2) trust fund rights are
subordinate to the section 339-1(2) trust fund rights of labor
or materials providers.
It is important to note that the new provision speaks
only of amounts already due under the terms of the loan
documents, which was meant to exclude all amounts that,
while owing, are not yet payable. It was not contemplated,
and it would be inappropriate to argue, that the entire debt
is due at any given time before maturity.' Thus, it will not
be necessary to retain all common charges in trust until the
debt is fully repaid, so long as currently required payments
are being made. On the other hand, maturity can occur by
acceleration, so that counsel will need to be especially atten-
tive to such matters.
Although use of the section 339-jj(2) trust fund device
does not directly mandate the payment of amounts due un-
der the loan documents, such use is expected normally to
have that effect, inasmuch as a board of managers will rarely
be in a position simply to decline to make any payments
whatever to others. Almost always, payments will have to be
See supra text accompanying note 56.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-uj, -1(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999).
Although one or two of the practitioners involved in some of the original
"brainstorming" sessions expressed concern that the requirement of payment of the
amount "due" might be interpreted to mean, at any time, the full balance of the
amount that had been borrowed, the prevailing view was that it was virtually im-
possible that such an unreasonable interpretation would be adopted by the courts.
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made so that essential services will be maintained. In
drafting sessions there was some discussion about including
in the law a provision making clear that unit owners could
not do an end run around the provision by setting up an ad
hoc body to collect and remit sums intended to maintain such
services; however, the majority view was that it was unnec-
essary to do so, both because the courts could be relied upon
to apply the statute in such a way as to prevent such she-
nanigans and also because it was believed to be unlikely that
anyone would risk criminal prosecution by participating in
such a scheme.
The drafters of the new law considered the inclusion of
the trust fund device to be essential if mainstream lenders
were to be induced to make loans on normal commercial
terms. Indeed, the drafters were so certain that lenders
would normally insist on this form of assurance that early
drafts provided that, as in the case of labor and materials
providers under section 339-1(2), the commitment was auto-
matic (subject, of course, to the ability of a lender to waive
the benefit of the provision). At the urging of some of the
legislators, though, the provision was modified to allow a
board either to agree in the loan documents to receive com-
mon charges as trust funds for the repayment of borrowed
amounts or (in theory, at least) to decline to make such an
agreement.
All along the road from initial thought to embodiment in
the state's law, reservations were expressed as to the wisdom
of allowing a board to undertake such exposure in order to ef-
fectuate a borrowing on behalf of unit owners. To put it in
stark terms: Should it be made possible for a board of man-
agers to agree to put a lender in a position to threaten board
members with incarceration or amercement if they chose to
use limited funds on hand to keep the premises habitable
rather than to meet current obligations on the loan? After
reflection, the answer was always affirmative-for a number
of reasons, including the following:
(1) As noted above, the same power had long ago been
placed in the hands of providers of labor or materials for the
common elements, and no major difficulties had ensued.
(2) If a board should run into a legitimate and unantici-
pated problem, it is to be expected that a mainstream lend-
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ing institution would grant forbearance on reasonable terms.
And, if there should be a genuine issue-such as a nonfrivo-
lous dispute as to how much is payable at a particular point
in time-a court of equity could be relied upon to fashion ap-
propriate relief, whether injunctive or otherwise.
(3) All homeowners, including owners of cooperative
apartments, risk even more devastating losses if required
mortgage payments are not made.
(4) Under the statute as enacted, a board of managers
can fully protect itself by simply declining to confer this par-
ticular form of assurance on a lender. 9 Alternatively, a
board can negotiate for extended grace periods and/or other
ameliorations. But borrowers must understand that lenders
in all likelihood will, and not improperly, insist on trust fund
provisions as the heart of their protection. Whether or not a
board grants to a lender the trust fund form of assurance will
doubtless be determined by the circumstances of the mar-
ketplace, including the relative bargaining powers of the
parties and the amount of competition.
In the end, the lawmakers were convinced-and, in the
authors' opinion, correctly so-that none of the other forms of
assurance would regularly instill in lenders a sufficient de-
gree of confidence that they could enforce repayment of any
loans that they might make to boards of managers, so that
there would have been little point in enacting the condomin-
ium borrowing law without the trust fund provision.
I. Subdivision 2-Right to Cause Increase in Common Charges
It is apparent that some of the other assurances could be
rendered nugatory by a failing on the part of a recalcitrant
and aggressive board to assess common charges at a high
enough level. For example, a lien to enforce the payment of
common charges would be of little use if the unit owner sim-
ply had no payment obligation in the first instance. Accord-
ingly, the new statute allows a board to agree in loan docu-
ments that, if the lender so requires, the board will increase
common charges to the extent necessary to pay any amounts
It is interesting to note that a board has less control as to debts to contrac-
tors; under section 339-1(2) a manager or a managing agent can, without any par-
ticipation by the board, expose the board members to liability in that context. See
supra text accompanying note 56.
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due under the provisions of the loan, which, as noted above,
would usually be only periodic payments, special payments,
late charges, and the like (but which would include the full
remaining principal amount on maturity, whether by reason
of acceleration or upon arrival at the end of the original
term). For example, if monthly payments were not being
made because the board had insufficient funds and was
unwilling to adopt an increase in regular common charges, a
lender could step in and require the board to assess the unit
owners their proportionate shares of the deficiency. Alter-
natively, in order to ensure that the board would have suffi-
cient funds to make regular payments, a lender might re-
quire an increase in common charges to be established at the
inception of the loan. In addition, if a loan were to mature,
whether by mere expiration of time or as the result of an ac-
celeration, an unpaid lender could require the board to as-
sess the unit owners their applicable portions of the debt at
that time." Presumably, a mandatory injunction would be
obtainable if a board were to disregard an obligation to in-
crease common charges.
It bears emphasis that the statute authorizes a board to
grant only a very limited power to a lender in this regard.
An uncircumscribed power to bring about increases would be
inappropriate and almost certainly unenforceable.
J. Subdivision 2-Priorities
After some consideration, the drafters decided-not
unanimously-that on the whole it would be better to defer
to another day consideration of the entire subject of priorities
as between lenders making loans to condominiums.9 Conse-
g Ironically, the unit owners would then have to fund the expenditure by im-
mediate lump-sum contributions, much as if financing pursuant to section 339-jj had
never become available.
9' The optimum way to deal with such issues would appear to be for the statute
to permit a lender to file a notice of its loan (perhaps in the file that the recording
officer is required by New York Real Property Law section 339-p to keep under a
separate number for each condominium) and to afford protection to any that does so
file. Such a new provision could also deal with the subordinate but potentially im-
portant issue of the position of a lender that has not yet made advances mandated
or authorized by the loan documents to be made at a future time. Theoretically, a
lender could require the condominium documents to be amended to prohibit any fur-
ther borrowing, but that would seldom be a practical approach. It is to be expected
that, apart from any public office safeguards, lenders will require the adoption of
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quently, with only the above-noted exception of the preser-
vation of the trust fund priority of providers of labor or ma-
terials for the common elements, section 339-J contains
nothing specific on the point.
As to three of the four kinds of repayment assurances,
that would not appear to be a major omission. To the extent
that rents are involved, the usual rent assignment rules can
be applied to income stream assignments;2 well-known rec-
resolutions to be included in the condominium's records, both to prevent excessive
borrowing from a financial protection point of view and, possibly, to provide actual
notice to a subsequent lender that reviews such records as part of its due diligence.
A subsequent lender proceeding in the face of such actual notice might be in a poor
position to enlist the aid of a court of equity.
92 It should be noted that the recordability of a section 339-jj assignment is or
would be a mixed blessing. A lender who is satisfied that he is the first one on the
scene might well prefer non-recordability. If his assignment is recordable and he
fails to record it, he will come in behind a subsequent lender without notice who
does record his assignment. Also, indexing two documents (i.e., the assignment and
the instrument terminating it) against every unit can be quite expensive in some
counties. On the other hand, the holder of a senior non-recordable assignment runs
no priority-loss risk by failing to offer it for recording.
An assignment of rents, as opposed to an assignment of common charges, would
plainly be recordable under New York Real Property Law section 294-a (which pro-
vides for the recording, and effect of non-recording, of an assignment of rents), and
it is to be expected that an assignment of rents to be received from any units or
other realty held by the board will normally be recorded. However, because of the
inordinate expense that may be involved, the situation is likely to be much more
problematic as to an assignment of rents to be received from the common elements.
Common charges clearly are not rents. See Frisch v. Bellmarc Management, Inc.,
597 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (App. Div. 1993). It follows that section 294-a would not apply
to an assignment of common charges.
Although the point is perhaps arguable, New York Real Property Law section
291 (which provides for the recording, and effect of non-recording, of a "conveyance")
would likewise appear to be inapplicable to an assignment of common charges, in-
asmuch as, insofar as possibly relevant here, New York Real Property Law section
290 defines a "conveyance" as a "written instrument, by which any estate or interest
in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the title
to any real property may be affected."
The Condominium Act has since its inception provided that "every instrument
affecting the property or any unit included within the meaning of 'conveyance' as
used in article nine of this chapter [which includes sections 290, 291 and 294-al,
shall be entitled to be indexed and recorded pursuant to and with the same effect as
provided in said article nine." N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-s (McKinney 1989)
(emphasis added). This provision would appear to be redundant; section 291 would
apply ex proprio vigore to "every instrument... within the [section 290] meaning of
'conveyance,'" whether or not it affected any condominium property.
The legislative proposal in the form advanced by the New York State Bar As-
sociation included an attempt to make every section 339-uj assignment recordable.
However, it did so by suggesting a revision of section 339-s that would have included
a reference to such an assignment as an "instrument affecting the property or any
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ordation and perfection rules are plainly applicable to liens
granted on property held by the board of managers,93 and
there would seem to be no difficulty in having more than one
lender able to require an increase in common charges.
It may be, though, that troublesome priority questions
will arise in connection with the trust fund provision. Where
more than one lender has been granted this safeguard, how
is it to be determined which has first call on the funds? Or
must they be paid pro rata?
If one lender is to take precedence over another, it is
likely that the rule will normally be first-in-time, first-in-
right. In that event, it will be necessary for a potential
lender to assure itself that it is first in line, and reliance on
title insurance will not be an option. It would seem that
comfort similar to that enjoyed by a mortgagee that has re-
corded its mortgage is not obtainable as the law stands at
present. However, still available are protective provisions in
loan documents, affidavits from board members and opinions
of counsel.
If, on the other hand, all lenders that have received the
trust fund form of assurance will be entitled to pro rata pay-
ment regardless of timing-which would seem to be the more
natural reading of the statute-even a first-in-time lender
will have something to worry about. In that case, no matter
what kinds of covenants a lender has obtained in its loan
unit included within the [section 290] meaning of " 'conveyance'." Some of those in-
volved in preliminary discussions felt that this approach was unsatisfactory. More
precisely, the proposal called for amending the first sentence of section 339-s to read
as follows (new matter italicized):
The declaration, any amendment or amendments thereof, an assignment
made in accordance with §33 9 -jj, and every other instrument affecting the
property or any unit included within the meaning of 'conveyance' as used in
article nine of this chapter, shall be entitled to be indexed and recorded
pursuant to and with the same effect as provided in said article nine.
However, this portion of the Bar Association proposal was omitted from the bills
that were actually introduced. The proponents of the new law were never made
aware of why that happened, but the practical exigencies of the situation did not
admit of pressing the point.
'3 There may be some uncertainty as to how UCC-1 financing statements should
be filed. Accordingly, prudent lenders may attempt to file under several permuta-
tions of the name of the grantor of a security interest. For example, filing might be
attempted under all of the following- "The Board of Managers of the XYZ Condomin-




documents, other perfectly legitimate (and also victimized)
subsequent lenders may appear and properly claim a right to
share in any trust fund.
It remains to be seen whether the statute's silence on
such matters will prove to be a significant deterrent to lend-
ers or whether the pressures of competition will cause such
concerns to be brushed aside.
K. Subdivision 3
The purpose of this provision is to preserve, to the extent
that doing so may be necessary, any agreements that were
properly authorized in condominium documents and at law
prior to the enactment of the new section. In addition, the
provision allows for the possibility that boards of managers
might be authorized, presumably by the declaration and/or
by-laws, to have powers beyond those specified in section
339-ji.
There were differences of opinion as to whether a provi-
sion of this kind was necessary or would be desirable. Al-
though a majority of the participants in preliminary drafting
sessions felt that it was unnecessary, the pleonasm was in-
cluded in the proposal in order to confirm explicitly what was
believed to be the rule and thereby preempt any mischievous
arguments that might otherwise be made to the contrary.
V. CONCLUSION
By adopting section 339-uj, New York has taken a giant
step to bolster the viability of the state's condominiums. To
achieve its aims, the statute incorporates some creative de-
vices, but there is no apparent reason that it should not op-
erate smoothly as it is put into effect by willing lenders and
motivated borrowers.
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